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CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTIONS UPON PUBLIC
DEBT IN NORTH CAROLINA
WILLIAM HENRY HOYT* AND JEFFERSON B. FORDHAM**
At the November, 1936, general election the voters of North Car-
olina approved an amendment to Section 4 of article V of the state con-
stitution, which was certified by the governor to the secretary of state
on November 25, 1936, and thenceforth that section has read as follows:
"Sec. 4. Limitations upon the increase of public debts. The Gen-
eral Assembly shall have the power to contract debts and to pledge the
faith and credit of the State and to authorize counties and municipalities
to contract debts and pledge their faith and credit for the following
purposes:
"To fund or refund a valid existing debt;
"To borrow in anticipation of the collection of taxes due and pay-
able within the fiscal year to an amount not exceeding fifty per centum
of such taxes;
"To supply a casual deficit;
"To suppress riots or insurrections, or to repel invasions.
"For any purpose other than these enumerated, the General Assem-
bly shall have no power, during any biennium, to contract new debts on
behalf of the State to an amount in excess- of two-thirds of the amount
by which the State's outstanding indebtedness shall have been reduced
during the next preceding biennium, unless the subject be submitted
to a vote of the people of the State; and for any purpose other than
these enumerated the General Assembly shall have no power to author-
ize counties or municipalities to contract debts, and counties and munic-
ipalities shall not contract debts, during any fiscal year, to an amount
exceeding two-thirds of the amount by which the outstanding indebted-
ness of the particular county or municipality shall have been reduced
during the next preceding fiscal year, unless the subject be submitted
to a vote of the people of the particular county or municipality. In any
election held in the State or in any county or municipality under the
provisions of this section, the proposed indebtedness must be approved
by a majority of those who shall vote thereon. Aid the General Assem-
bly shall have no power to give or lend the credit of the State in aid of
any person, association, or corporation, except to aid in the completion
of such railroads as may be unfinished at the time of the adoption of
this Constitution, or in which the State has a direct pecuniary interest,
unless the subject be submitted to a direct vote of the people of the
State, and be approved by a majority of those who shall vote thereon."
* Member of the New York Bar and of the law firm of Reed, Hoyt, Washburn
& Clay, New York City.
** Member of the North Carolina and New York Bars, associated with Reed,
Hoyt, Washburn & Clay, New York City. Formerly Professor of Law at West
Virginia University.
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Except for the last sentence, which survived unchanged, the amendment
constitutes a radical revision of the old section, which, for convenient
comparison, is set out below.1 In brief, the amendment (1) does away
with the former state debt limit of 7Y2% of assessed values, (2) author-
izes the contracting of state and local debt for four enumerated pur-
poses, and (3) forbids the contracting of new debt by the state in any
biennium, and new debt by a local unit in any fiscal year, in excess of
two-thirds of the amount by which its outstanding debt was reduced
during the like period next -preceding, unless the proposed debt is ap-
proved by the voters. The exception based upon debt reduction is
unique, we believe, in state constitutions.
The salient features of the amendment were salvaged from the
wreckage of the proposed constitution which was scheduled for sub-
mission to the voters at the 1934 general election but went aground
upon an election technicality.2 That instrument contained a section
identical with the amendment, except that, like the old Section 4 of
article V, it applied only to the state.3 All debt restrictions affecting
local units were embodied in a separate section of the proposed constitu-
tion, the content of which was quite different.4  It is evident that 'the
draftsmen of the amendment adopted the state model and simply ex-
tended its field of application to "counties and municipalities."
So far as it concerns state debt, the amendment seems less restrictive
than the former limitation. It sets up a qualified election requirement
"'Sec. 4. Restrictions upon the increase of the public debt except int certain
contingencies. Except for refunding of valid bonded debt, and except to supply a
casual deficit, or for suppressing invasions or insurrections, the General Assembly
shall have no power to contract any new debt or pecuniary obligation in behalf
of the State to an amount exceeding in the aggregate, including the then existing
debt recognized by the State, and deducting sinking funds then on -hand, and the
par value of the stock in the Carolina Railroad Company and the Atlantic apd
North Carolina Railroad Company owned by the State, seven and one-half per
cent of the assessed valuation of taxable property within the State as last fixed
for taxation... "
*The act submitting the proposed constitution to the voters, N. C. Pub. Laws
1933, c. 383, was ratified on May 8, 1933. It provided for submission "at the next
general election." On May 9, 1933, an act (N. C. Pub. Laws, c. 403) was ratified
which called a "general election" for November, 1933, to decide whether a con-
vention should be called to consider the proposed Prohibition Repeal Amendment.
Since this 1933 election turned out to be the "next general election" and since the
proposed North Carolina constitution was not voted on then it could not be sub-
mitted at the 1934 general election. 'PROPOSED N. C. CoxsT. art. V, §2.
'Paoosa N. C. CoNsT. art. V, §5. (1) Like N. C. CONsT. art. VII, §7, this
provision applied to any "county, city, town, or other municipal corporation," not
to "counties and municipalities"; (2) the election requirement prescribed was
stated as a prohibition- subject to exceptions and not in part as a grant of
power as is the amendment; (3) it did not permit non-electoral debt to supply a
casual deficit or to suppress riots, etc., as does the amendment; (4) it set no
limit on non-electoral tax anticipation -borrowing, whereas the amendment con-
fines it to fifty per centum of taxes of a fiscal year; (5) it had a materially dif-
ferent debt-reduction provision confined to bonded debt and limiting new non-
electoral bonded debt (.presumably in the next fiscal year) to one-half the previous
year's reduction; and (6) it contained a much more drastic election requirement.
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in lieu of the former 73/27 limit. The state debt was not far below
the 7Y2% limit when the amendment was proposed in 1935.
5
So far as it concerns debt of local units of government, the amend-
ment imposes an additional restriction. The old Section 7 of article VII,
which is not greatly affected by the amendment, if modified at all, for-
bids any local unit to incur debt without an election, except for "neces-
sary expenses," but nearly everything, except schools, hospitals, airports,
golf courses, and aid to railroads has been held to fall within the
exception. Thus the section was so ineffective as a check on abuse of
public credit that the tide of defaults in local debt in North Carolina
had reached a level second only to that in Florida when the amendment
was adopted.6 On January 1, 1936, according to one reliable authority,7
there were no less than 130 cities and towns, 45 counties, and 75 other
local units in default in North Carolina. In some instances bonded
debt was in the neighborhood of 50% of taxable values.8 It is thus
easy to understand how the voters could have been in a mood at the
1936 general election to take from their representatives in local govern-
ment much of the power hitherto held by them to incur new debts and
thenceforth to have a direct hand in the matter themselves.
The purpose of this paper is to explore the legal implications of the
amendment. Necessarily, many questions must be left open. The best
that can be done here is, so far as space permits, to raise the more
important legal questions likely to arise under the amendment and to
discuss considerations affecting the answers to them. We are not un-
mindful of the remark of Mr. Justice Barnhill in the recent case of
Hallyburton v. Board of Education of Burke County,9 that the limita-
tions of the amendment "are in such terms that 'he who runs may read'
and understand." With deference, We believe that, far from being so
simple, the amendment is heavy laden with legal questions which are
likely to plague the supreme court for a long time to come.10
'According to the STATE AND MUNICIPAL COMPENDIUM, Part II (Dec. 31,
1935) 214, the recognized debt of the state, adjusted to June 30, 1935, was $170,-
548,000, the sinking fund balance -was then $13,478,424 and the par value of the
stock of the N. C. R. R. and the Atl. and N. C, R. R. was $4,266,800. Thus the
net debt was $152,802,776. The COMPENDIUM gives 1934 total assessed valuations
of*$2,152,443,146. The limit would have been 7312% of this sum or $161,432,236.
See Gardner, The Proposed Constitution for North Carolina (1934) 1 Pop.
Gov. 62 ef seq.
'That is, if special improvement districts are excluded.
' See the summary of defaults as of January 1, 1936, prepared by TnE BOND
BuYR and reproduced in HILHOUSE, MUNiCiPAL BONDS (1936) 25.
1 See HILLHOUSE, op. cit. supra note 7, at 9, listing North Carolina and Florida
as the only states in which debt service on local public debt, as of 1932, consti-
tuted over 250o of total expenditures.
9213 N. C. 9, 14, 195 S. E. 21, 25 (1938).
"'In the celebrated case of Levy v. McClellan, 196 N. Y. 178, 89 N. E. 569(1909), a test casd involving the application of the New York constitutional debt
limit governing counties and cities to New York City's then financial circumstances,
forty-three questions relating to the meaning and application of the limitation
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Up to the present writing but few of the questions considered in
this paper have been passed upon by the supreme court.1 Thus fre-
quent reference to the decisions interpreting constitutional debt limita-
tions of other states will be made in this paper, but it must be borne in
mind that those decisions are so numerous as to preclude detailed com-
parative consideration. The emphasis in the discussion that follows will
be upon the meaning of the amendment as applied to local units on
the assumption that the bulk of the difficulties will arise in local
administration.
One preliminary question demands notice: Does the amendment
apply to all local governmental units? It applies in terms to "counties
and municipalities," whereas, the limitations of Section 7 of article VII
apply to any "county, city, town or other municipal corporation." The
latter provision, as construed by the supreme court, must be taken to
apply to all local units ;12 it shows on its face that it was intended to
be inclusive. But is "municipalities," taken alone, to be deemed to
cover all sorts of special-function local units, such as sanitary districts,
as distinguished from those organized for general purposes of local
government, such as cities and towns? It is unfortunate that literally
inclusive terms were not used, but the comprehensive character of the
amendment is so dominant in an over-all view of the matter that it may
well be said that this is no place for linguistic refinements. Any other
view would open the way to evasion of the election requirement by the
creation of special-function local units with the power to contract debts
and to levy taxes to provide for their payment.'8
were certified to and answered by the court of appeals. The New York limitation
was, moreover, much simpler than the amendment. It would be a boon to the court
and to those to be governed by the amendment if a similar case were instituted
in North Carolina.
On the economic aspects of the subject see SEcRIsT, RESTuCTIONS ON PUBLIC
INDEBm3TFSS (1914) passim.
.. Thomson v. Harnett County,'212 N. C. 214, 193 S. E. 158 (1937); Hally-
burton v. Board of Education, 213 N. C. 9, 195 S. E. 21 (1938) ; Gill v. Charlotte,
213 N. C. 160, 195 S. E. 368 (1938). See Williamson v. High Point, 213 N. C.
96, 103, 195 S. E. 90, 94 (1938).
'Smith v. Bd. of Trustees of Robersonville Graded School, 141 N. C. 143, 53
S. E. 524 (1906) (school district) ; Reed v. Howerton Engineering Co., 188 N. C.
39, 123 S. E. 479 (1924) (sewer district). N. C. CoNsT. art. V, §5, exempts prop-
erty belonging to the state and municipal corporations from taxation. It 'has been
held that a drainage district is not a municipal corporation within the sense of
this section. Board of Comm'rs of Muddy Creek Drainage Dist. v. Webb, 160
N. C. 594, 76 S. E. 552 (1912).
Viewing the amendment as a whole it is a bit startling to face the notion that
a school or sanitary district could borrow to repel invasions.
Effective evasion -would include hurdling the necessary expense limitation of
§7 of art. VII but there are purposes which have been held to be necessary
expenses of special public corporations or districts. Reed v. Howerton Engineer-
ing Co., 188 N. C. 39, 123 S. E. 479 (1924) (sanitary sewers); Town of Kenil-
worth v. Hyder, 197 N. C. 85, 147 S. E. 736 (1929) (water and sewer system).
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FUNDING OR REFUNDING VALID EXISTING DEBT
The first of the four enumerated purposes for which the legislature
is granted express authority to contract state debt and to authorize the
contracting of county and municipal debt, without regard to the election
requirement, is "to fund or refund a valid existing debt." The first
and most important question under this topic turns upon the effect of
the word "existing." Does this refer to the time that the amendment
took-effect or to the time of a proposed funding or refunding? As a
matter of grammar, the use of the word "existing" in the latter sense
would be tautological, for the very idea of funding or refunding pre-
sumes the existence of a debt to be funded or refunded. While too
much stress should not be placed on nicety of language in constitutional
interpretation, it is also true under a respected rule of constitutional and
statutory construction that every word in the written law is to be given
some effect if possible since it is reasonably to be supposed to have been
used meaningfully.14 As this section stood prior to the 1936 amend-
ment it contained an exception under which the general assembly was
authorized to refund "valid bonded" debt of the state. The word "ex-
isting" did not appear in this provision. Is it to be said that the amend-
ment alters the section so radically that the word "existing" is not to be
accorded any significance?
On the other side of the scale rests the rather persuasive point that,
viewed as a whole, there is no question but that in applying the amend-
ment we would not ordinarily be concerned with the date of its taking
effect but would seek to determine its meaning as to the particular cir-
cumstances at the particular time. This factor is reinforced by the
practical consideration that, even where constitutional debt limitations
do not expressly except funding and refunding obligations, they are
deemed by the courts not to be included because they involve merely
the extension of the life of existing debt in new form, not the contract-
ing of new debt.' 5 The Supreme Court of North Carolina has recently
emphasized this characteristic of funding and refunding obligations.' 6
The next question is whether this provision is confined to debt valid
in its inception or, at least, valid in a technical sense when funding or
refunding is proposed. The answer to the first part of this question is
fairly simple-original validity is not essential. But is it sufficient that
a debt be enforceable? Whatever practical importance this question
may have is due to the so-called estoppel doctrine, which is recognized
and applied by the courts of North Carolina,' 7 and which precludes a
1'II LeVis' SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CoNsTRucTIox (1904) §380.
1I DILLON, MUNICIPAL CoRPoRATIONS (5th ed. 1911) §202; 6 McQumL',
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (Rev. ed. 1937) §2385.
"Bryson City Bank v. Bryson City, 213 N. C. 165, 195 S. E. 398 (1938).
"' The leading case is Belo v. Comnm'rs of Forsyth County, 76 N. C. 489 (1877).
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unit from showing defects or irregularities in the issuance of bonds in-
consistent with recitals on the face of the bonds, as against bona fide
purchasers for value. Thus we may have bonds that are enforceable
although not technically valid. But such a distinction appears tenuous
indeed for present purposes. To confine the term "valid" to debt which
was essentially valid, aside from considerations of remedy and enforce-
ment, would be highly artificial.
For the most part, little would turn upon, the character of the debt
proposed to be funded or refunded, whether the obligation was con-
tractual, quasi-contractual, delictual, or what not, and whether it was
incurred for current expenses or capital outlay, whether for necessary
or non-necessary expenses, and whether for special or ordinary pur-
poses. All that is required is that it be valid and existing.
An interesting question is presented in this connection by a line of
Florida cases. Not unlike the new North Carolina limitations, Section
6 of article IX of the Florida constitution excepts refunding bonds from
a requirement that bonds of local units be voted. The Supreme Court
of Florida has said that this exception contemplates a renewal of the
old debt and ". . . any attempt to add to, enhance, enlarge or increase
such obligation by means of a pledge of special revenue, properties or
income not theretofore obligated or pledged in the original bonds will
be held to be in violation .. ." of Section 6 of article IX of the state
constitution, unless approved by the voters.' 8 This idea, that to add to
the security behind the old debt renders refunding bonds new debt, is
novel and seems to be peculiar to Florida. It is obvious that such a rule
tends to embarrass a unit in working out an advantageous readjust-
ment of its debt with its creditors because it greatly restricts the bar-
gaining field.
It is not material that refunding bonds bear a higher rate of interest
than the old.' 9 But the issuance of refunding bonds at a discount would
raise a more substantial question since that might involve an increase
in the principal amount of debt outstanding.20
TAX ANTICIPATION BoRRowING
The second enumerated purpose to which the election requirement
does not apply is borrowing in anticipation of the collection of taxes
due and payable within the fiscal year to an amount not exceeding 50%
of such taxes. What taxes may thus be anticipated? Since it is un-
qualified in that respect the term "taxes" literally includes all forms of
taxes levied by the particular unit. It is doubtful, however, whether it
" State v. Citrus County, 116 Fla. 676, 157 So. 4, 11 (1934).
" Bolich v. Winston-Salem, 202 N. C. 786, 164 S. E. 361 (1932).
'But note the Florida view, Sullivan v. Tampa, 101 Fla. 298, 134 So. 211
(1931).
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would include taxes not levied by or upon behalf of the unit, such as
state taxes the proceeds of which were allocated to counties for county
purposes. In such a case it would seem that the state would be the unit
qualified to borrow against the tax, because it would be the unit actually
levying the tax regardless of the distribution of the proceeds therefrom.
In the not uncommon situation where the taxes of a school or other dis-
trict are levied and collected for its benefit by the officers of another unit,
such as a county or city, which would be the proper unit to do the bor-
rowing? Presumably, the district, because the taxes are essentially its
taxes regardless of the method of levy and collection in operation.
This sort of borrowing is confined to anticipating taxes "due and
payable" in the then current fiscal year. What of uncollected taxes of
previous years? They are clearly "payable" in the 'current fiscal year
but became "due" earlier. The provision has specific reference to a fiscal
year and a certain percentage of taxes which conveys the idea that the
only taxes concerned are taxes which became due in that fiscal year.
Revenues other than taxes would not come within the language of
this provision. Thus income from public services which are paid for
on a fee basis, more commonly termed rates in the case of utility serv-
ices, would not be included. (We are referring here to general obliga-
tion borrowing; as we shall indicate later special revenue obligations
payable solely from the revenues of the project for which they were
issued are not debts within the meaning of the amendment.) It has
been suggested that this fact may work a substantial hardship upon
municipalities which are able to pare down their operating levies by
applying net utility earnings to general municipal expenses.2 1 It seems,
however, that the point is not a serious one because under existing gen-
eral law, at least, only net utility revenues, after payment of expenses
of operation and maintenances and making provision for debt service
on obligations issued to finance the particular utility, could be used in
this way.22  Net revenues are not determinable until the end of the
operating period, the fiscal year, and it is difficult to see how they could
properly be anticipated by borrowing. Were net revenues determined
on a monthly basis, moreover, the money would come in regularly, thus
mitigating the need of anticipation.
I GRicE, A SUMMARY OF, CITY AND COUNTY FINANCIAL PBOBLEMS RAISED BY
THE RECENTLY ADOPTED AMENDMENT TO THE NORTH CAROLINA CONSTITUTION(Institute of Government, Chapel Hill, N. C., Dec. 1936) 8.
N. C. CODE ANY. (Michie, 1935) §2959 provides:
"So much of the net revenue derived by the municipality in any fiscal year
from the operation of any revenue producing enterprise owned by the munic-
ipality after paying all expenses of operating, managing, repairing, enlarging
and extending such enterprise, shall be applied, first to the payment of the
interest, payable in the next succeeding year on bonds issued for such enter-
prise, and next, to the payment of the amount necessary to be raised by tax
in such succeeding year for the payment of the principal of said bonds."
Net revenues of one year are cash on hand for the next.
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Probably the most important question under this provision is whether
the amount which may be borrowed at any given time against taxes of
the current year, when added to the amount of outstanding previous
loans against those taxes, is limited to 50% of the amount of the taxes
remaining uncollected at the time of the proposed loan. It would seem
that this question should be answered in the affirmative, if the purpose
of the 50% limitation was to provide an ample margin to insure pay-
ment of such loans from collections of the taxes anticipated. On the
other hand, if the purpose was to enable a unit to finish out a year's
operations despite inadequate tax collections during the year, then it
would seem permissible to borrow up to the full amount of the taxes
remaining uncollected at the time of the proposed loan, so long as the
total'loans do not exceed 50% of the amount of the levy.
There is also a question whether the provision relates only to bor-
rowing against taxes already levied. Prior to levy the amount is un-
known although within limits there is no genuine uncertainty. The
amendment, moreover, refers to borrowing in anticipation of the col-
lection of taxes, not the levy and collection of taxes. At present the
question is an open one.23
Must unvoted tax anticipation loans be payable within the fiscal year
in which made? Since no limit on maturities is expressly established
it may reasonably be assumed that the grant of power to borrow in
anticipation of taxes is not qualified in that respect. Obviously there
are practical limitations upon the maturities of such paper. On the
other hand, by a literal interpretation of the debt-reduction provision
of the amendment the payment of such paper in a subsequent year
would be a reduction of outstanding indebtedness even though made
from the collections anticipated.2
4
SUPPLYING A CASUAL DEFICIT
This provision is a carry-over from the old Section 4 of article V
of the constitution. It is new, of course, as to local units. There appear
to have been no decisions of the supreme court spelling out its meaning.
Constitutional limitations upon state debt quite generally contain such
an exception,2 5 but there are only a few instances of its use in the field
of local government.26 The late proposed new constitution for North
Carolina confined this provision to state debt. Prediction is hazardouq
- For comparative material see 6 McQuiLL N, MuicIPAr, CORPORATIONS (Rev.
ed. 1937) §2379.
" See the discussion under the topic What Is Out.stauiding Indebtedness? infra.
"This sort of thing seems to date from §10 of art. VII of the N. Y. CONSTITU-
TIox oF 1846; the -rovision still exists as §2 of art. VII of the present N. Y.
CoNsTn=TION.
'See particularly GA. CoxsT. art. VII, §7; and MD. CONST. art. XI, §7 (ap-
plicable only to city of Baltimore).
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but we risk the guess that this provision will prove to be a rubber link
in the chain of limitation which circumscribes local borrowing, unless
very narrowly construed. As applied to local units, moreover, its very
vagueness is calculated to render its administration difficult and to invite
litigation. 27  This is not true as to the state because ordinarily ihe
courts may be expected to consider a finding by the legislature that a
"casual deficit" exists conclusiveY27*
This subject has two major aspects. As a practical matter a deficit
may arise either because of increased expenditures or due to deficient
revenues. If by "casual" is meant unanticipated, unforeseen, or unex,
pected,2 , then this proVision would seem to cover a deficit caused by
either unforeseen expenditures or an unexpected failure of revenues.
While existing general law does not appear to permit supplemental
appropriations by counties or municipal corporations,2 9 there is nothing
to prevent the legislature from abandoning this policy and were it to do
so the danger of deficit financing of current expenses by local units
would be greatly increased. Ultimately, the inquiry whether a particular
deficit is casual is a judicial question as to the local units, but the courts
will have so little to go on that predictability will probably be low in-
deed. For instance, how can one be certain until a court of competent
jurisdiction has spoken to the point whether a given expenditure in ex-
cess of appropriations made in the general appropriation measure
adopted at the begining of a fiscal year was unanticipated? Is the real
question whether the expense was in fact anticipated or whether it rea-
sonably should have been anticipated? In addition to the difficulty of
applying a subjective test it is to be presumed that local officers have
acted in good faith until the contrary is shown,80 and thus it would seem
that only by adopting the objective test could the courts perform their
function in the administration of the provision effectively.
Getting down to cases, expenditures occasioned by extraordinary cir-
cumstances, such as a flood or cyclone, might safely be labeled unantic-
ipated, whereas serious questions might arise as to outlay for routine
" The Supreme Court of Georgia has struggled with the subject in numerous
cases, but it may be questioned whether that court has been able to put the matter
on a reasonably predictable basis.
" See GRAY, op. cit. infra note 48.
" In Lewis v. Lofley, 92 Ga. 804, 808, 11 S. E. 57, 59 (1894), we find the fol-
lowing definition:
"The word 'casual' means that which happens by accident, or is brought
about by an unknown cause; and we .think the framers of the constitution, in
using this language, meant some unforeseen or unexpected deficiency, or an
insufficiency of funds to meet some unforeseen and necessary expense."
The subject is governed by the County Fiscal Control Act, N. C. Pub. Laws
1927, c. 146, 'which is made applicable to cities and towns by §65 et seq. of the
Local Government Act, N. C Pub. Laws 1931, c. 60.
'The point seems obvious. See Russell v. Whitt, 161 Ky. 187, 170 S. W. 609,
611 (1914).
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matters such as ordinary maintenance of .public buildings or salaries of
officials.
In course of time the supreme court will probably be asked to decide
whether an expenditure for other than essential governmental functions
of a unit, or for capital outlay, may create a "casual deficit." Since the
term has no fixed meaning, it is open to interpretation on this point.
The second division of the subject relates to failures of current rev-
enues to meet valid appropriations. An anticipated failure of revenues
could hardly be casual. Just as in the matter of determining the pro-
priety or necessity of expenditures for lawful municipal purposes, so
with the business of estimating revenues the courts will not interfere
except in the case of plain abuse of discretion, 81 but there can be scant
doubt about the power of the courts to review revenue deficiencies for the
purpose of determining whether they are "casual." But once again the rub
comes in administration. Be it assumed that the governing body of a
city in making provision for the appropriations of a given year esti-
mated one hundred per cent collection of ad valorem taxes for that year.
Even were this done in a era of great prosperity common experience
tells us that the estimate would be arbitrary. But no matter what the
size of the ensuing deficit, and even though unexpected circumstances
cropped up to contribute to it, it would ordinarily be impossible to de-
termine what part was casual and what part deliberate.
For all that appears a casual revenue deficiency might occur with
respect to any legitimate sort of revenue relied upon to meet appropria-
tions and would-not be confined to any particular form of taxation, or
even to taxes for that matter. Nor does it appear to be confined to
deficiencies due to failure of revenues to come in; tax receipts might be
unexpectedly lost due to failure of a properly selected depository bank,
or the defalcations of a public officer or employee. The ensuing deficit
under such circumstances surely could not have been anticipated when
the revenue estimate of that year was made unless at that time it was
known that the depository of the unit was in failing circumstances or
that there were untrustworthy people handling the funds of the unit.
The question has been raised whether a deficit represented by inter-
fund advances instead of claims held by creditors, would be within the
sense of the amendment.32 Ultimately the court must clarify the matter.
It would seem that there is ground to support an affirmative answer
where the lending fund had to be restored to meet demands on it.
It is significant that a casual deficit represented by floating debt can
be funded into long-term obligations. This sort of thing was an im-
'East St. Louis v. United States ex rel. Zebley, 110 U. S. 321, 4. Sup. Ct. 21,
28 L. ed. 162 (1884), is the leading case. See also State v. Staples, 157 N. C. 637,
73 S. E. 112 (1911); Brown v. Hillsboro, 185 N. C. 368, 117 S. E. 41 (1923).
1 GracE, op. cit. supra note 21, at 9.
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portant factor in -the flood of defaults on obligations of local units which
inundated the state during the depression. Since the amendment places
no limit on debt contracted to supply a casual deficit, unlike constitu-
tional provisions in other states,3 3 the general assembly might well em-
body such a policy in legislation. It may, of course, deny the power
to contract such debts to local units altogether, if it sees fit.
SUPPRESSING RIOTS OR INSURRECTIONS OR REPELLING
INVASIONS
"Suppressing invasions or insurrections" was an object excepted
from the old state debt limit.8 4 The amendment added the suppression
of riots to this category and so changed the wording as to authorize
non-electoral borrowing both by the state, counties and municipalities
"to suppress riots or insurrections, or to repel invasions." It is rather
extraordinary that such a provision should be applied to local units.
Suppressing riots is part of the normal local function of keeping the
peace, but keeping down revolt or repelling invaders is hardly a local
responsibility in the accepted sense, although there may well be local
participation in such matters simply as a matter of mobilizing for the
common good. It will be remembered that the Federal Constitution
imposes a duty on the United States to come to the aid of a state faced
with such an exigency.
While this provision will doubtless be of no great practical impor-
tance in the ordinary administration of public affairs,8 5 one further
point deserves brief comment. Suppression assumes the existence of a
condition to "quell" or "subdue" and thus it may be questioned whether
the provision applies to debt contracted "to prevent" riots or insurrec-
tions.3 6 The apparent significance of this difference is probably diluted
materially by the fact that the business of suppression would compre-
hend the making of provision in advance for an emergency.
THE DEBT-REDUCTION PROVISION
Thus far we have dealt with the four enumerated purposes for which
the amendment authorizes the contracting of public debt without electoral
approval. We come now to the important general restriction set up by
the amendment, namely, that the contracting of new debt be approved
I See GA. CONsT. art. VII, §7, limiting such loans to one-fifth of one per cent
of the assessed value of taxable property in a unit.
"This provision also seems to have originated in §10 of art. VII of the N. Y.
CONSTiTuON OF 1846 and to have been widely employed as an exception in state
debt limitations.
'It could well become significant in time of serious industrial or social con-
flict, however.
Thus, the preferred connotation given by the STANDARD DIcrIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE is: "To put down or put an end to by force; overpower;
crush; subdue; as, to suppress an insurrection."
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by a vote of the people. The general restriction is that the contracting
of public debt must first be approved at an election in the unit at which
a majority of those voting on the proposition vote for the indebtedness.
This is a much less rigid requirement than that of Section 7 of article
VII of the constitution. The latter requires that non-necessary expense
debt of a local unit have the approval of a majority of the qualified
voters of the-unit, given at an election on the subject."
A debt proposition might be submitted repeatedly to the voters until
a favorable vote was finally obtained.38 On the other hand, once such
approval has been given is it to be deemed irrevocable? It seems clear
beyond reasonable doubt that it would not be at any time prior to the
contracting of the proposed debt. Would approval by the voters after
the fact serve to validate unauthorized efforts by a governing body to
incur debt? The amendment refers to voting upon "proposed indebt-
edness," which lends some countenance to the notion that it was con-
templated, that electoral approval be a condition precedent rather than an
authorization89 but the supreme court has taken the opposite view under
Section 7 of article VII.40
It is the novel debt reduction exception to the election requirement
more than the general restriction itself that calls for extended comment.
The exception permits the incurring of state debt during a biennium 1
without a state election up to two-thirds of the amount by which the
state's outstanding indebtedness shall have been reduced during the next
preceding biennium and grants like permission, on a fiscal year basis to
counties and municipalities. 42 It seems reasonably clear that "outstand-
ing" refers to the time as of which any given computation of debt is to
be made and not to the time when the amendment took effect. It is to
be noted that there is a statute in New Jersey which bases an exception
to restrictions upon municipal debt upon retirement of debt existing
w"Qualified" means registered voters. Thus a special registration for a bond
election may take much of the sting out of the requirement. Hammond v. Mc-
Rae, 182 N. C. 747, 110 S. E. 102 (1921).
'This seems obvious and attention is called to it simply because of its prac-
tical implications.
But even under this theory, that electoral approval is a matter of affecting
the method of incurring, not the power to incur, debt, there is authority that there
can be validation by a subsequent election held pursuant to statutory authority.
I Dnm.oN, op. cit. supra note 15, at 432, and cases cited.
"Hammond v. McRae, 182 N. C. 747, 110 S. E. 102 (1921); Jones v. New
Bern, 184 N. C. 131, 113 S. E. 663 (1922).
"
'A biennium, according to North Carolina fiscal practice, is a span of two
consecutive fiscal years following a regular session of the general assembly. It is
a perfectly good North Carolina term, but the lexicographers have taken scant
notice of it.
"With reference to the state the amendment speaks of contracting "new"
debt but drops this term in connection with local debt. It is not believed that the
omissiodi carries any significance.
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when the limitation was imposed, but the statute speaks explicitly to the
point.42&
To live under this provision a borrowing unit will have roughly three
times as onerous a problem of debt computation and thus a proportion-
ately greater burden of administration and risk of error than has a unit
in a state which has a conventional percentage-of-taxable-values debt
limit. To determine how much debt may be contracted at a given time
without a vote it will be necessary (1),to determine the outstanding
debt of the unit at the start of the preceding fiscal period, (2) to make
a like finding as of the end of that period, and (3) to determine how
much debt has already been contracted in the current fiscal period. In
determining the reduction in the preceding fiscal period, new debt in-
curred during and which survives that period must, of course, be taken
into account.
43
There is no cumulation of non-electoral borrowing power built up
by debt reduction. If the reduction of one biennium of fiscal year is
not availed of in the next it is lost for it is only the reduction of the
"next preceding" biennium or fiscal year that counts.
Could the general assembly alter or permit changes in the biennium
or the fiscal year? One thing seems clear-a biennium means two years
and any period of more or less than twenty-four months would not meet
the test. Likewise, a fiscal year is a period of twelve months and neither
more nor less. The only apparent alternative to these assumptions is
chaos.44 Within these limitations, the legislature, doubtless, may change
the date of beginning of the fiscal year and of the biennium and thus
automatically the end of such a period. Suppose the present fiscal year
were changed to conform to the calendar year. There would be an odd
interval of six months that would appear to be neither flesh, fish, nor
fowl; it could not safely be deemed a fiscal period or part of one for
purposes either of determining debt reduction or of contracting new debt
against a previous reduction. It could not be tacked onto either the
last of the old or first of the new fiscal years without making the period
more than a "year." Possibly, an exception might be implied to cover
such a transitional odd interval.
N. J. Act6 of 1935, c. 77, §208. For a statutory exception of this sort ante-
dating the amendment see the charter of the City of High Point, N. C. N. C.
Private Laws 1931, c. 107 art. XIII §5, as amended by N. C. Private Laws 1931,
c. 158, §7.
There is a possible exception in the case of current expense items and tax
anticipation loans. See the topic WH3AT Is OUTSTANDING INDEBTEDNESS? infra.
"If a fiscal year could be other than twelve months in duration the legislature
could juggle the subject at pleasure and make the "fiscal year" as long or short
as it saw fit.
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I
WHAT IS NEW DEBT?
It would be most comforting if one could approach this subject with
a precise and reliable definition of "debt." Unfortunately, at least for
purposes of its use in constitutional limitations upon public debt, there
is no such thing. There is a zone of doubt which remains to be
charted by the supreme court. Meanwhile, however, a few general
observations may be ventured.
The restriction upon the incurring of new debt applies, in terms, to
any debt contracted by a unit. It is thus not confined to funded debt
or borrowing evidenced by formal obligations but extends as well to
simple contracts for things or services furnished on credit.45
It seems to apply, moreover, whether the amount which the unit
may be called upon to pay under contract is fixed or determinable from
the outset, so long as there is a legal commitment to pay something.
The fact that the unit is receiving a consideration under the contract of
equal or even greater value than what it undertakes to pay is not ma-
terial; the question is one of debt, not of solvency.40 It is not essential
that state contracts be judicially enforceable,-otherwise, as Dillon has
pointed out,47 the state would never incur debt except where it had
consented to be sued. An undertaking of a local unit, however, not
supported by any remedial sanction, would be a mere shell.
While there is some language in the opinions of courts of other
states relating to constitutional debt limitations to the effect that the
word "debt" is used in its ordinary sense, the decisions generally do
not go that far. On the contrary, while the courts have shown them-
selves, naturally enough, to be debtminded just like the rest of us in
times of stringency, they have found the term "debt" to have a ma-
terially more restricted meaning as used in constitutional debt limita-
tions than its meaning in common parlance.48 It is evident that to
give the provision we are considering literal effect would be to ham-
string public administration. On its face, it would apply to the use
of credit for the most routine operating expenses. Experience else-
where suggests a number of possible qualifications.
'In the opinion in the Hallyburton case, 213 N. C. 9, 195 S. E. 21 (1938),
the court discussed the amendment in terms of funded debt, but there is no reason
to suppose that it was doing so otherwise than by way of illustration.
For convenience, the term "borrowing" will be used freely in this paper to
include both its common meaning and the direct use of credit.
, I DILLoN, op. cit. supra note 15, at 352. See especially Stone v. Chicago,
207 Ill. 492, 69 N. E. 970 (1904).
4'T Id. at 351.
'This will appear from the discussion that follows. See generally 6 Mc-
.UiLLIN, op. cit. supra note 15, §2374. Compare the strict view taken by GRAY,
LimITATIONS oN TAXING POWER AND PUBLIC INDEBTEDNESS (1906) §1061.
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a. Current Expenses
First in importance come current expenses. By the great weight
of authority general liabilities incurred for current operations which
are within current revenues, whether on hand or yet to be collected,
are not debts for present purposes.49 In practice this means that
to enjoy the favored status an item must be (1) for a current ex-
pense, (2) charged to a valid appropriation, and (3) covered by esti-
mated current revenues. In the normal course of events such trans-
actions are strictly current, involving no additional burden upon the
taxpayer, and can with some reason be said to fall beyond the design
of the constitutional restriction. It is obvious, too, that this rule of
exemption is strongly buttressed by necessity. Government has be-
come a big and complex business, strictly cash operation of which is
out of the question.
There are two special considerations bearing upon the interpreta-
tion of the amendment in relation to this subject. It might be urged, on
the one band, that express provision for tax anticipation borrowing
enables a unit to put itself in funds before revenue collections begin to
come in and thereby to operate on a pay-as-you-go basis. But that this
militates strongly against the existence of an intent to permit current
operations on credit is not evident, even if true; rather, it would seem
that non-electoral tax anticipation borrowing is permitted as a con-
venience and was not intended as a device whch must be employed
regularly by the state and local units in order to carry on. On the
other hand, unvoted debt is expressly authorized to supply a casual
deficit. If an absolute pay-as-you-go scheme was in contemplation,
how could a casual deficit arise?
What are "current expenses" in the sense of this rule? Dillon has
listed a great number of items which have been judicially placed in this
category.50 Such conventional expenses of a city as salaries of offi-
cials, maintenance of streets, police and fire protection and routine
health and sanitary services are easily classified for this purpose, even
if the rule be rested upon necessity instead of legitimate interpretation
of "debt." Logically, it may be questioned whether the element of
necessity should be considered for, strictly speaking, the constitution
knows no necessity which would disallow any of its provisions.51
If the true test be whether the given financial commitment is one
that in the normal course of administration will be met by current
funds because fully provided for by current operating revenues, any
proper current operating expense, whether incurred in the perform-
'For a collection of cases see I DILLON, op. cit. supra note 15, §195; and 6
MCQUILLIN, op. cit. supra note 15, §2378.1 I DILLON, 10c. cit. supra note 49. 1 GRAY, op. cit. supra note 48, at 1051.
THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
ance of an essential function or not, would be within the rule. Thus,
if a special tax had been voted in a North Carolina county for the
establishment and maintenance of a hospital, which the supreme court
has ruled is not a necessary expense under Section 7 of article VII
of the constitution,52 liabilities incurred in operating the hospital, if
within estimated current receipts from the hospital tax, would not be
"debts" when incurred.
Logically, the rule might well be deemed to apply to budgeted
capital outlay, sometimes termed extraordinary expenses for contrast.
But the courts, for the most part, have regarded this notion with dis-
favor, due mainly, no doubt, to the absence of impelling necessity. 3
It is true, too, that the risk of deficits would be greater here. It is
difficult to weigh such considerations against the countervailing factor
that to hold the rule inapplicable is to discourage the meeting of capital
needs as far as possible from current funds.
If the use of credit directly in obtaining current supplies and services
would not be contracting debts, the question arises whether the same
would be true of borrowing to put a unit in funds to pay for such
items. The Georgia Court has said, for one, that it would not be so.54
That would seem to be the correct answer in our case because such
borrowing would in fact be done in anticipation of the collection of
taxes and thus would be governed by the express provisions of the
amendment on the subject.
b. Cash on Hand
Even in the case of capital outlay, if the unit has cash on hand
appropriated to that object and sufficient to cover all liabilities con-
tracted, there is ample authority that no debt is incurred within the
meaning of a constitutional debt restriction.55 The proposition has been
stated more liberally,--Dillon says that to the extent of such cash no
debt is created.56 That is not open to objection where the contract is
divisible, but where the cash on hand is less than the amount involved
in an indivisible contract there is a question whether it would stand
or fall as a unit.57 Technically, where a unit has issued $1,000,000 of
bonds for a public work and then lets a contract for the job it has con-
tracted liabilities aggregating $2,000,000 even though the bond proceeds
IPalmer v. Haywood County, 212 N. C. 284, 193 S. E. 668 (1937), citing
earlier cases. Two judges dissented.
I I Dn ozN, loc. cit. supra note 50; I JONES, BoNDs AND BOND SECURITIES (4th
ed. 1935) §106.
"Butts County v. Jackson Banking Co., 129 Ga. 801, 60 S. E. 149 (1908).
,4Levy v. McClellan, 196 N. Y. 178, 89 N. E. 569 (1909); 6 McQULLX N, op.
cit. supra note 15, §2386.
I DILLON, op. cit. .supra, note 15, §197.
" See the topic, The Effect of Contracts Exceeding the Limit, infra.
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are on hand. What this common-sense rule does is permit the making
of contracts covered by such cash on hand without regard to a debt
limitation.
c. Continuing Contracts
In some jurisdictions the current expense rule has been extended to
contracts covering the furnishing of services or supplies, needed for
current operations, for a period of years,58 and the Supreme Court of
the United States has given this step its benediction.59 The rational
basis of this view is that unless the contract by its terms requires a
different interpretation it is to be deemed not to create a debt at the
outset for the full price of all services or supplies that may be fur-
nished under it but only to impose periodic liability at the stipulated
rate as performance on the part of the opposite party takes place. If
the periodic payments falling within a given fiscal year are within cur-
rent revenues it is held that no debt has been contracted.60
Such treatment of continuing contracts seems to be a logical exten-
sion of the current expense rule even though the unit is firmly bound
by the contract from the outset for if annual requirements are fully
budgeted no real increase in the debt burden of the unit is to be antici-
pated. The rule does not apply to capital expenditures."' The case is
dearer than where the entire cost is to be provided from revenues of
the current year, since it involves the anticipation of taxes of future
years for extraordinary expenses much as does a bond issue, with like
effect on the taxpayer.
d. Instalment Contracts
Efforts to evade debt limitations by resort to instalment payments
have met with scant success.62  Such a scheme involves a present con-
sideration moving to the unit as distinguished from the future con-
'A recent case in point is Scranton Electric Co. v. Borough .of Old Forge,
309 Pa. 73, 163 At. 154' (1932). For collections of cases see I DILos, op. cit.
supra note 15, §196; and 6 McQuiLmIx, op. cit. supra note 15, §2392.
'Walla Walla City v. Walla Walla Water Co., 172 U. S. 1, 19 Sup. Ct. 77,
43 L. ed. 341 (1898).
'
0It will be seen that under this view, even though the -payments falling due
within the first fiscal year of the contract, for example, were not covered by cur-
rent revenues, the debt contracted would be only the amount of those payments.
This does not fit well into the debt-reduction scheme for no one can say in ad-
vance whether the payments required in a subsequent year would be within two-
thirds of the preceding year's reduction. Since under the County Fiscal Control
Act, N. C. Pub. Laws 1927, c. 146, such items would have to be budgeted, it
should be presumed that the law will be complied -with and thus that payments
of a future year will be within current revenues.
The rule has been criticized in I JONES, op. cit. supra note 53, §105.
'1 See note 62, infra.
= Renfroe v. Atlanta, 140 Ga. 81, 78 S. E. 449 (1913) ; Spilman v. Parkers-
burg, 35 W. Va. 605, 14 S. E. 279 (1891) ; I JoNEs, op. cit. supra note 53, §107,
citing a number of cases.
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sideration involved in continuing contracts of the type just discussed.
A conditional sale of a fire truck to a municipality is a fair sample of
such a contract; its provision for deferred payments puts it on the same
basis as serial bonds issued for a like purpose, and in each case debt
for the full amount is contracted at the outset. But suppose the con-
tract relates to an ordinary expense. Assume, for example, that at a
time of extremely low prices a city with adequate storage facilities
wanted to buy enough coal to meet its estimated needs for three years,
and the seller was willing to have payment of one-third of the price
deferred for one year and a third for two years, each payment to be
budgeted as a current item in the appropriate year. Even though the
calculated effect of the transaction is to save the taxpayer money, a
present debt for the total price is created for a present consideration
and thus cannot be rationalized as persuasively as a continuing contract.
e. Contingent Claims
The decisions of courts of other states on the question whether
contingent liabilities are debts for purposes of constitutional debt limits
are not in harmony.63 Probably the most satisfactory test that has
been enunciated is whether the contingency is a matter subject to the
control of the unit. If the unit is committed from the start and the
event upon which its liability becomes fixed is an external matter beyond
its control, even though not bound to happen, it may be said that a
debt is incurred ab initio, but if the unit is left to control the event no
debt is incurred until the condition is met.
64
f. Obligations Payable from a Special Fund
It has not been many years since special assessments for benefits
were a highly favored means of financing local improvements, the idea
being to place the burden on property specially benefited instead of in-
creasing the ad valorem tax burden on property generally.6 5 One
factor which stimulated the use of this device in other states was the
inability of particular local units to finance local improvements by gen-
eral obligation borrowing due to constitutional and statutory restric-
tions upon such debt. While special assessment financing has taken
varied forms the important development to which we wish to advert
here was the practice of making the contract for an improvement pay-
O'It is -held in South Carolina that they are not debts. Lillard v. Melton, 103
S. C. 10, 87 S. E. 421 (1915). Contra: Smith v. Guin, 229 Ala. 61, 155 So. 865(1934). Sed generally I JoNzs, op. cit. supra note 53, §94; 6 McQuiLLIN, op. cit.
supra note 15, §2377.
'This is the Iowa theory of the matter. Burlington Water Co. v. Woodward,
49 Iowa 58 (1878). See also I DImLoN, op. cit. supra note 15, §200.
w The idea is an old one. It is said that the use of special assessments in New
York goes back to 1691. Williams and Nehemkis, Municipal Improvements as
Affected by Constitutional Debt Limitations (1937) 37 COL. L. Rav. 177, 187 n. 56.
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able solely from special assessments on property in the affected area.68
Such assessments constituted the sole source of payment to the credi-
tor,67 and the courts are agreed that such financing does not constitute
debt within the sense of constitutional and statutory debt limitations.68
In recent years, due to the sobering influence of the depression and
the relatively high general obligation debt of many local units the coun-
try over, together with the active stimulus of federal loans and grants in
aid of local self-liquidating public works, which accentuated the appar-
ent painlessness of such borrowing, so-called revenue bonds have become
a favored instrument of public finance. The kinship between revenue
bonds and special assessment financing of the character just described
is obvious. There is no precise usage, but broadly speaking a revenue
bond is a public obligation payable solely from the net revenues of the
improvement for which it was issued.69 Such obligations may be is-
sued either as special obligations of the state or a local unit, which is
organized for governmental purposes with the power to tax to effectuate
those ends, or as general obligations of a public corporation organized to
perform a particular public service, which can be made to pay its way,
and having no source of revenue other than the income of the public
improvements and activities under its control. The term most com-
monly applied to special corporations of this character is "authority," 70
the most conspicuous instance of which is the Port of New York
Authority. This type of financing, while most frequently resorted to in
aid of utilities such as electric and water systems, has been brought
into play in financing a great variety of public works. 71
The not inconsiderable learning which has accumulated on the ques-
tion of whether revenue bonds are debts in the sense of constitutional
debt limitations is focalized in the so-called special fund doctrine. In
its more general sense the gist of this doctrine as applied to revenue
bonds, is that public obligations payable solely from a special fund
derived from the revenues of the property or undertaking financed by
such obligations are not debts within the meaning of a constitutional
'HILLHOUSE, Op. cit. supra note 7, c. VI.
' For a collection of authorities see Williams and Nehemkis, supra note 65,
at 188 n. 8s Ibid.
While not always so stated the rule is confined to obligations payable only
from net, not gross, revenues. Were gross revenues pledged with the effect of
rendering expenses of operation and maintenance a tax burden (there is usually a
covenant to maintain and operate until the bonds are paid) debt would be created.
Smith v. Guin, 229 Ala. 61, 155 So. 865 (1934) ; In re Opinion of the Justices,
226 Ala. 570, 148 So. 111 (1933).
' See generally Nehemkis, The Public Authority: Some Legal and Practical
Aspects (1937) 47 YALE L. J. 14.
1 The new gymnasium and women's dormitory of the University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill were financed in part in this way. The device has been
used conspicuously in aid of bridge construction. Its use for such purposes as
hospitals and auditoriums is not uncommon.
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debt limitation. There are decisions on the subject from over half
the states and not more than three can be listed as not having embraced
the doctrine either with or without reservations. 72 The weight of
authority supports the "broad special fund doctrine," the purport of
which is that no debt is created so long as the special fund is derived
from net non-tax revenues. The typical case is that where the net in-
come from existing properties, improved with the aid of the revenue
obligations, is included. It doubtless would apply where net revenues
of distinct and independent property or services are pledged.7 8 A
few states, however, following the lead of Illinois, 74 are committed
to the "restricted special fund doctrine," 75 which narrows the protec-
tion of the rule to obligations payable solely from the net revenues of
the specific properties paid for with the proceeds of the obligations.
The fundamental test under either view is whether the obligation is pay-
able from taxes. It is held that since the prime object of debt limita-
tions is to keep the tax burden in bounds only obligations payable from
taxes are within their purview.76 In an important sense general obli-
gation municipal bonds are simply a means of anticipating -the taxes
of future years. But the restricted theory holds that to pledge revenues
of existing properties is to require indirectly taxation to pay the revenue
obligations since it absorbs net revenues of those existing properties
which would otherwise go into the general fund of the unit in reduction
of taxes.
In 1903 the Supreme Court of North Carolina adopted the broad
special fund doctrine. In Brockenbrough v. Board of Water Commis-
sioners,W7 it appeared that the city of Charlotte, acting under special
enabling legislation, was about to issue revenue bonds without a vote
of the people of the city to finance improvements to its existing water
' All but the most recent cases are collected by Foley, Revenue Financing of
Public Enterprises (1936) 35 Micu. L. REv. 1, app., and Williams and Nehernkis,
supra note 70, at 209 et seq. See also the collection of cases in Fairbanks, Morse
& Co. v. Wagoner, 81 F. (2d) 209, 216 n. 4 (C. C. A. 10th, 1936). The dissenting
states are Idaho: Feil v. Coeur D'Alene, 23 Idaho 32, 129 Pac. 643 (1912) ; Mary-
land: Baltimore v. Gill, 31 Md. 375 (1869); and New Jersty: Wilson v. State
Water Supply Comm., 84 N. J. Eq. 150, 93 Atl. 732 (1915). Georgia .has been
put in this group by Williams and Nehemkis, mtpra note 53, at 210.
"The point was noticed but not passed on in State v. Fort Pierce, 126 Fla.
184, 170 So. 742 (1936), where the net revenues of existing water and electric
properties were pledged to pay bonds issued to finance improvements to the elec-
tric properties. Both properties were operated as a single system.
I The leading case is Joliet v. Alexander, 194 Ill. 457, 62 N. E. 861 (1902).
Cf. fHfirgrove v. Jacksonville, 366 Ill. 163, 8 N. E. (2d) (187) (1937).
"See the collection of cases referred to in n. 72. See also Smith v. Water-
works Bd. of Cullman, 175 So. 380 (Ala. 1937); Cartledge v. City Council of
Augusta, 183 Ga. 414, 188 S. E. 675 (1936).
See the oft-cited New York case, Bank for Savings v. Grace, 102 N. Y. 313,
318, 89 N. E. 569, 573 (1886). This idea underlieg the decision in Brockenbrough
v. Board of Water Comm'rs, 134 N. C. 1, 46 S. E. 28 (1903).
1 See note 76, supra.
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system.78 The bonds were payable from the revenues of the entire
system and enjoyed the additional security of a mortgage upon the
system as a whole. It was held that regardless of whether a water
supply was to be deemed a necessary expense within the meaning of
Section 7 of article VII of the constitution,7 9 the bonds were valid with-
out electoral approval because they were not "debts." This decision
goes beyond the broad special fund theory because the bonds were
secured by a mortgage on existing property paid for by the taxpayers
of the city. The opinion contains no comment on this aspect of the
case.
80
In the recent case of Williamson v. City of High Point,8 the court
announced the conclusion that "debt" meant the same in the amend-
ment as in Section 7 of article VII and reaffirmed the special fund
doctrine in the following language:
"The prevailing opinion in other jurisdictions is that the special
fund doctrine, as enunciated in the Brockenbrough case, supra, to the
effect that a contract by a municipality to purchase and pay for property
for public purposes solely out of the net earnings of the property, with-
out resort directly or indirectly to revenue derived from taxation, does
not create a debt within the meaning of such constitutional provisions."
This statement was apparently not intended to be a departure from
the Brockenbrough decision, but it comes close to being a recital of the
restricted doctrine. Since the situation before the .Court met the
restricted theory there was no occasion to review the subject, so it
seems fair to state that the broad special fund theory still obtains in
North Carolina.
It is to be observed that revenue financing is not limited to formal
obligations or certificates of indebtedness. The seller of equipment may
agree to payment of the purchase price solely from the revenues pro-
duced thereby. 82 There are, in addition, a number of legal questions
'The defendant board, which was created a separate corporation by the rev-
enue bond enabling statute, was authorized to take title and control over the old
and new properties, and the bonds were to be issued in its name. The court
treated these facts as immaterial for purposes of the case and decided it as though
the city were acting directly.
"In a case decided only eighteen days later electric and water systems were
held to be necessary expenses. Fawcett v. Mt. Airy, 134 N. C. 125, 45 S. E. 1029
(1903) ; overruling earlier decisions to the contrary. See the critical comment in
G AY, op. cit. supra note 48, at 1060.80If the mortgage was confined to the property acquired with the bond proceeds
that would be a different matter, not involving an indirect tax burden. See Clarke
v. S. C. Public Service Authority, 177 S. C. 427, 181 S. E. 481 (1935).
a213 N. C. 96, 105, 195 S. E. 90, 96 (1938).
" Fairbanks, Morse & Co. v. Wagoner, 81 F. (2d) 209 (C. C. A. 10th, 1936);
Fuller Conditioiral Sales Contracts in Municipal Purchases-Financing Self-
Liquidating Activities (1938) 3 LE:G. NOTES ox LOCAL Gov'T 267.
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bearing upon the debt status of revenue obligations which, for want of
space, cannot be explored here. 3
g. Assumption of Debt of Another Unit
Assumption by one unit of debt of another may or may not involve
the element of contract. Obviously an assumption by a county of
township road bonds issued for improvement of county roads which
took the form of an exchange of county for township bonds or the is-
suance of the former to provide funds to pay the latter would involve
the contracting of new county debt. The mere passage of a resolution
assuming the district debt pursuant to statute, which made such an act
binding on the county, would, under the decisions, involve the creation
of county debt.mR3 It has been held, since the adoption of the amend-
ment, that a pre-amendment assumption of township road debt ren-
dered it county debt, which could be refunded by the issuance of county
bonds after the amendment took effect without regard to electoral
approval.84 In that case the county had passed a resolution authoriz-
ing the issuance of refunding bonds and the making of agreements
with the holders of the old bonds as to the purchase or exchange of
those bonds. The trial court found that the county had agreed to
assume the debt and this fact is probably the real basis for the decision.
It is quite doubtful whether the same result would have been warranted
had the county board done no more than pass a resolution providing for
the issuance of the refunding bonds.
h. Non-Contract Liabilities
Broadly speaking liabilities not arising ex contractu are not within the
terms of the restriction upon the creation of new debt. But, here again,
it is not safe to be too literal and generalization is hazardous. The subject
can be considered under three main heads,-(1) torts, (2) quasi-con-
tractual claims, and (3) liabilities imposed by statute.
(1) Torts. This phase of the subject is relatively simple,-tort
liabilities are not in their inception the sort of debt the amendment is
concerned with; it has to do with the use of credit, not with responsi-
bility for civil wrongs. It would appear that the matter does not depend
upon the element of fault; otherwise the amendment would constitute
They arise largely from the covenants commonly made in support of revenue
bonds, such as an agreement by the unit to pay for service it takes from the
revenue project for its uses. The sounder view is that this sort of covenant does
not render the bonds debts; although the contrary might be true were there an
unqualified covenant to take and pay for the service. See the well-reasoned Florida
case, State v. Punta Gorda, 124 Fla. 512, 168 So. 835 (1936) ; also Street v. Rip-
ley, 161 So. 835 (Miss. 1936).
1 See Hickory v. Catawba County, 206 N. C. 165, 172, 173 S. E. 56, 60 (1934).
Thomson v. Harnett County, 209 N. C. 662, 184 S. E. 490 (1936), 212 N. C.
214, 193 S. E. 158 (1937).
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a limitation upon the power of the general assembly to impose rules of
absolute liability upon local units, instanced by statutes imposing liability
to a traveler for any injury due to defects in streets,8 5 or rendering a
local unit responsible in damages to the victim of mob violence.86
(2) Quasi-contractual Liabilities. Serious questions can undoubt-
edly arise with respect to this type of claim which theoretically arises by
operation or implication of law and not from voluntary agreement. For
it so often happens that the occasion for seeking quasi-contractual relief
against a local unit is the invalidity or unenforceability of a voluntary
undertaking of the unit. As to that sort of case this much can be said
at once,-if the reason that the contract is invalid is that it was made
in violation of the amendment the courts cannot be counted upon to say
that the law implies an obligation and thus permit the amendment to be
defeated by indirection.8 7 There is a plausible distinction, however,
between imposing a general liability upon a unit for money had and
received or upon a quantum reruit or quantum valebat, and imposing a
constructive trust upon money received from a claimant or assets into
which it can be traced not dedicated to a public purpose.88 In the
latter situation unjust enrichment can be prevented by specific redress
which does not substitute an implied obligation for the invalid voluntary
one.
89
It may well be that liabilities arising by operation of law which do
not contravene the policy of the amendment will be accorded favorable
treatment by the supreme court. Doubtless, municipal liability for the
amount or value of monies, goods or services furnished by mistake and
not pursuant to contract will fall in this category as would a liability to
refund an illegally collected tax.90
I For a discussion of statutes relating to municipal liability in connection with
defective streets see 7 McQUILIN, MuNicPAL Coa'oRAToNs (2d ed. 1927) §2904
et seq.
" N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §3945 (relating to civil liability of a county
in case of a lynching). See JONES, op. cit. supra note 53, §97.
'The leading case is Litchfield v. Ballou, 114 U. S. 190, 5 Sup. Ct. 820. 29
L. ed. 132 (1885). Note the discussion of the point in the recent Alabama case,
Oppenheim v. City of Florence, 222 Ala. 50, 155 So. 859 (1934).
Once there has been dedication to a public purpose the public interest would
seem to prevail over that of the claimant just as fully as though, he were seeking
to levy an execution against such property, which, of course, could not be done.
Fordham, Methods of Enforcing Satisfaction of Obligations of Public Corporations
(1933) 33 CoL. L. REv. 28.
Nuveen v. Bd. of Public Instruction of Gadsden County, 88 F. (2d) 175
(C. C. A. 5th, 1937), (1937) 16 N. C. L. Rav. 42. (Constructive trust imposed
on school building, which was not a proper municipal purpose).
I' See I DmLoN, op. cit. supra note 15, §201, especially at 378, note 3.
The right to damages for the taking of private property for public use with-
out making just compensation would hardly be debt within the spirit of the amend-
ment in the ordinary case, else the property owner would be without redress were
it too late to get preventive relief. Dillon distinguishes cases like Keller v. Scran-
ton, 200 Pa. 130, 49 Atl. 781 (1901), as essentially based on the element of con-
tract. For purposes of computing outstanding debt, liabilities for property taken
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(3) Liabilities Imposed by Statute. This topic poses knotty ques-
tions. The safe course for public officials for the time being is to act
on the view that the legislature cannot impose or compel the assumption
of a liability where a unit could not incur it voluntarily, consistently
with- the amendment. Thus a legislative mandate to construct a new
courthouse or jail because the old was unsafe or a health hazard would
not enable the unit to use its credit for the purpose free of the restric-
tions of the amendment. Constitutional debt restrictions draw arbitrary
lines and cannot be disallowed by legislative mandate no matter how
pressing the need.91
Suppose municipal bonds were issued in the fiscal year 1936-37 in
violation of the debt-reduction provision of the amendment and that
in a subsequent fiscal year they were validated by special act of the
legislature which took effect on a date when the unit could have issued
bonds without electoral sanction. Would the statute be valid? If the
act was effective the validity of the bonds would derive more from
the statute than the attempted contract. The accepted theory is that a
legislature may validate any transaction it could have authorized in the
first instance.92 Consider the converse situation where unvoted bonds
lived up to the debt-reduction requirement but were invalid because
issued in violation of statute and were later made the subject of a
validating statute enacted when the unit had no non-electoral borrow-
ing power for such a purpose. Would the statute be effective?
So far as the restriction on incurring new debt is concerned neither
the letter nor the spirit of the amendment would seem to affect the
power of the legislature to merge, consolidate, split up, or otherwise
alter local units.93 Thus, were the general assembly to consolidate two
contiguous towns into a single city there would be no increase in public
debt although technically the city would be a new juristic entity and
as to it the debt of the constituent units would be new.94 The element
of contract, moreover, is obviously wanting here.
for public use should be included at their estimated amount where their value has
not been finally determined. Levy v. McClellan, 196 N. Y. 178, 89 N. E. 569 (1909).
" Cf. Eaton v. Mimnaugh, 43 Ore. 465, 73 Pac. 754 (1903), and the discussion
of that case by GRAY, op. cit. supra note 48, at 1054.
'But this assumes the existence of the power to authorize at the time of rati-
fication. "The general and established proposition is that, what the legislature
could have authorized, it can ratify if it can authorize at the time of ratification."
Charlotte Harbor & N. Ry. v. Welles, 269 U. S. 8, 11, 43 Sup. Ct. 3, 4, 67 L. ed, 100.
102 (1922). See JoNEs, op. cit..supra note 53, for a discussion of the cases on the
subject.
'True v. Davis, 133 Ill. 522, 22 N. E. 410 (1889) ; People ex rel. Haight v.
Brown, 169 App. Div. 695, 15. N. Y. Supp. 564 (1915), affd on another ground,
216 N. Y. 674, 110 N. E. 171 (1915).
This technical point is of no moment because the successor corporation would
simply stand in the shoes of the old ones.
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One interesting feature of -the amendment is that a unit which is
overwhelmed with debt may, under the debt reduction scheme, incur
new debt without a popular vote whereas a completely new unit with
no debt whatever could not because it has no debt to reduce. That
would be the status, for example, of a populous community like Kannap-
olis were it incorporated today. This is not to condemn the general
requirement of an election, but to hold up the debt-reduction notion
for scrutiny.
2
WHAT IS OUTSTANDING INDEBTEDNESS?
While the restriction upon new debt is confined to contractual debt
there is no such qualification as to outstanding debt to'be computed in
determining debt reduction. Thus, "outstanding indebtedness," broadly
speaking, would comprehend all existing liabilities without regard to
their origin, form, or legal nature.95 Debt contracted for any of the four
enumerated purposes, not subject to the election requirement, would be
literally included in computing outstanding indebtedness.96 But pro-
posed indebtedness, although fully authorized and although all steps
preliminary to the incurring of the obligation have been taken, would
hardly seem to merit the label "outstanding." 97
It has been held in other jurisdictions that claims which are both
unliquidated and disputed are not to be included in computing outstand-
ing debt.98 Theoretically such a claim could be outstanding indebtedness
but the matter is too speculative for consideration. As to undisputed,
unliquidated claims, however, the prudent course is to estimate their
amount.
Should current expense items and tax anticipation loans remaining
unpaid at the end of the fiscal year be counted? There can be no
denying that, strictly speaking, they would be outstanding debt at the
end of that fiscal year and the beginning of the next. The real question
is whether uncollected taxes for that fiscal year should be offset against
debts of this sort since, loosely speaking, those taxes are pledged to
their payment. This is one of the more vexing questions raised by the
amendment about which speculation is not very fruitful. The matter
rests on the doorstep of the court. Concerning current expense items,
I Note the discussion of the "debt" and "indebtedness" terms in 6 McQumu.nx,
op. cit. supra note 15, §2374.
"This statement is subject to a possible practical qualification as to tax an-
ticipation obligations, presently to be stated.
"Cf. the rather remarkable Pennsylvania decision in Duane v. Philadelphia,
322 Pa. 33, 185 Atl. 401 (1936), where the circumstances were such that by hold-
ing authorized bonds to be existing debt the court enabled Philadelphia to exceed
the constitutional debt limit.
ILevy v. McClellan, 196 N. Y. 178, 89 N. E. 569 (1909); I Joims, op. cit.
supra note 53, §96.
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it will doubtless be contended that if they were not debts in their
inception their payment after the close of the fiscal year should not be
deemed to reduce debt, even though paid from new tax revenues.
Overdue interest is outstanding indebtedness. And it has even been
said that accrued, but not unearned, interest should be included in com-
puting existing debt.9  This treatment of accrued but unmatured inter-
est is' rather artificial, at least, where funds have already been raised
in the old fiscal year to cover the interest instalment which happens to
overlap the end of one and the start of another fiscal year.
a. Gross Debt versus Net Debt
How must payments into and from sinking funds be treated in cal-
culating debt reduction?1°" In states where the conventional type of
debt limit obtains it is now generally agreed that sinking funds must be
deducted in determining the debt of a unit.101 And the rule applies as
well to cash, and securities of other debtors in which sinking funds
have been' invested, as to obligations of the unit held by a sinking
fund.102 The reason of this net debt theory is quite compelling-liquid
assets dedicated. by law to the payment of public debt are, as a matter
of economic fact, provision for an amount of outstanding debt equal to
their value, and if the law be complied with technical retirement of that
amount of debt must follow as of course. In other words, payments
into sinking funds reduce net debt; the application of such funds to the
payment of debt does not; the one is the substance, the other the formal-
ity of debt retirement.
The real question is, then, whether there is anything in the language
or purpose of the amendment to exclude the application of the net debt
theory. There are at least three considerations which the supreme court
should weigh when it comes to settle this question. (1) The invi-
olability of sinking funds is specifically ordained by the constitution
itself.10 3 Thus, to employ the language of equity, there is ample legal
I I DILLON, op. cit. supra note 15, §205.
Invalid and unenforceable claims, represented by bonds or otherwise, are not
debt. Thus, even a claim barred by limitations should not be counted.
'This question was raised in Gill v. Charlotte, 213 N. C. 160, 195 S. E. 368(1938), but the court disposed of the case on another ground and did not consider
it.
" The leading case is probably Levy v. McClellan, 196 N. Y. 178, 89 N. E.
569 (1909). See generally I DiLLoN, op. cit. supra note 15, §§205, 206; 6 Mc-QI Lx, op. cit. supra note 15, §2397.
'Ibid. Contra: Brooke v. Philadelphia, 162 Pa. 123, 29 At. 387 (1894). The
sense of the rule is that sinking funds are a proper offset against gross debt be-
cause dedicated to the payment of the outstanding debt, so sinking fund assets,
including bonds of the unit held in the sinking fund, should be taken at their
actual, not their face value.
IN. C. CoNsT. art. II, §30. This applies to sinking funds of local units.
Mewborn v. Kinston, 199 N. C. 72, 154 S. E. 76 (1930).
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basis for deeming that to be done which ought to be done. (2) Section
4 of article V, prior to the amendment, expressly provided for deduction
of sinking funds. Is the revision of the section to be regarded as so
thoroughgoing that the dropping of this provision is to be accorded no
significance? (3) The reduction must be in "outstanding indebtedness."
Literally, this ignores sinking funds. Should it be given the same mean-
ing as "existing debt" as used in debt limitations in states which embrace
the net debt theory ?1o4
The net debt theory treats current tax'monies collected to pay serial
bonds in the same way as payments into sinking funds supporting term
bonds.10 5 This is important because there is a strong tendency to use
only serial bonds wherever practicable. To illustrate, let us assume that
a city had $1,100,000 of debt outstanding on June 30, 1937, the end of
the fiscal year, and at that time had $100,000 in cash collected that year
to meet a serial bond maturity of $100,000 on August 1, 1937. This
sum would have to be deducted from the debt total of $1,100,000 in
determining the net debt at the end of that fiscal year. In other words,
the net debt theory would, in effect, treat the debt reduction of $100,000
as occurring in 1936-37, and not in 1937-38, the fiscal year in which the
particular debt was actually paid. Assume further that the cash were
lost in a defunct bank or misappropriated in July, 1937, and the bonds
taken care of by refunding, the result would be that the net debt theorist,
who would still claim a reduction for the preceding year, would log-
ically have to treat the loss of the asset as a debt increase for the fiscal
year 1937-38.
Thee is some authority that uncollected taxes,1 6 even though delin-
quent,10 7 levied to meet debt principal, are a proper deduction from
gross debt. This is relevant to the North Carolina limit only in the
case of delinquent taxes because the reduction is calculated on the basis
of debt at the beginning and end of a fiscal year and the only uncollected
debt service taxes at those times would be delinquent taxes. The case
for permitting the deduction is not clear because the value of the asset
is difficult to determine and the burden is still on the taxpayer even
though his responsibility for the given year has been fixed.
' Illinois follows the net debt theory. Stone v. Chicago, 207 Ill. 492, 69 N. E.
970 (1904). ILL. CoNsT. art. IX, §12, provides in part:
"No county, city, township, school district, or other municipal corporation
shall be allowed to become indebted in any manner or for any purpose to an
amount, including existing indebtedness in the aggregate exceeding five per
centum on the value of the taxable property therein, to be ascertained by thelast assessment for state and county taxes previous to the incurring of such
indebtedness."
'Kronsbein v. Rochester, 76 App. Div. 494, 78 N. Y. Supp. 813 (4th Dep't
1902).
' See 6 McQuILLiN, op. cit. supra note 15, §2396, n. 88.
" Graham v. Spokane, 19 Wash. 447, 53 Pac. 714 (1898).
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It is the sounder view that only cash and other assets required by
law to be applied in retirement of existing debt may properly be de-
ducted.108 Funds and other assets which may lawfully be used for
other municipal purposes are hardly within the reason of the net debt
theory.1o9
b. Overlapping Units; Merger and Consolidation
In determining outstanding indebtedness it is not required that debt
of overlapping units be considered.110 Thus, debt of a special school
district coterminous with a city would not be included in computing
the debt of the city, and were the city to make payments on the district's
obligations no reduction of city debt would be effected. Once, however,
the city effectually assumed the debt of the district the converse would
be true.
What would be the effect of merger or consolidation of local units?
That would depend upon the terms of the enabling statute. If town B
were annexed by city A pursuant to a statute which did not impose the
debt of B upon A but required its payment from ad valorem taxes levied
in the territory that was B, the town debt would simply not be counted
in computing that of the city. On the other hand, the statute might
give the annexation the effect of shifting the town debt to the city's
back. 1 ' In the now quite commonplace situation where a county has
assumed school district debt incurred for the maintenance of public
schools in the county for the constitutional six months' term, it is not
entirely clear just what the relation of the county is to the creditor,1 1 2
where there is no agreement with him, but it seems safe to assume that
the debt is to be treated as that of the county for present purposes.
3
WHAT DEBT OF A CURRENT YEAR IS TO BE CHARGED AGAINST
THE REDUCTION
In determining whether a given debt may be contracted without a
vote of the people it is obviously necessary, after the debt reduction of
I See Kronsbein v. Rochester, 76 App. Div. 494, 78 N. Y. Supp. 813 (4th
Dep't 1902), for a good statement of the matter.
11 But there is some authority for their deduction. 6 McQuILLIn, op. Cit.
supra note 15, §2396.21
'Where the overlapping local units are really full-blown, distinct govern-
mental units there is no question about the matter, but when it comes to debt
nominally incurred by an independent unit which is essentially a mere depart-
ment or agency of the state or a local unit a real question is presented. Cf. Mc-
Cabe v. Gross, 274 N. Y. 39, 8 N. E. (2d) 269 (1937).
uIn, the less likely case where a unit is split up a nice question is presented.
Suppose a county were divided into two counties, how would credit for debt re-
duction be apportioned?2 The cases have dealt with the relation of the district to the county. See the
topic, Swnox 3 oF ARTicLE IX, infra.
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the preceding fiscal year has been determined, to determine further how
much of the non-electoral debt-incurring power of the current fiscal
year has been exhausted. For this purpose it is clear that debt con-
tracted for any one of the four expressly authorized purposes is not to
be considered. 1 3 With respect to debts outside the enumeration doubt-
less the most important question is whether voted debt is to be counted.
The supreme court has already decisively answered this question in the
affirmative. In Gill v. Charlotte,114 it was shown that on any basis of
computation the amount by which the city of Charlotte reduced its debt
during the fiscal year 1936-37 was materially less than the amount of
bonds issued early in the fiscal year 1937-38 after approval by the
voters. The city sought to issue additional bonds for street and sewer
purposes without a vote of the people to an amount within two-thirds
of what it conceived to be the city's debt reduction during the preceding
fiscal year. The supreme court upheld the plaintiff taxpayers' right to
an injunction restraining the bond issue on the ground that the voted
bonds were to be counted in determining whether debt up to two-thirds
of the preceding year's reduction had already been contracted in the cur-
rent fiscal year. In a brief opinion, the meat of which was a dictum
quoted from the opinion in the Hallyburton case,1 15 the court adopted a
literal view of the matter. No mention was made of a; line of decisions
of other courts cited in the brief of counsel for the city. In several
states there are constitutional debt limitations which set a general limit
but allow it to be exceeded up to a higher limit; some, for certain special
purposes such as utility services likely to be self-liquidating,116 and
others, where the debt has been voted."17 It is the weight of authority
that under such a limitation, special purpose or voted debt, as the case
may be, is not to be counted in computing debt-contracting power under
the primary limit."18 It is reasoned that the limitation bases the dis-
tinction on the purpose of debt or the fact of a popular vote but lays
no store by the order of time in which existing debts were incurred.
The practical effect of the decision in the Gill case is to give the
governing body of a unit a strong incentive to use up the non-electoral
borrowing power of the unit for a given year early in the year, par-
ticularly if new debt has been voted but not incurred or there is any
prospect that new debt may be voted later in the year. In other words,
the governing body would naturally be inclined to exercise its unfet-
' See Hallyburton v. Bd. of Education, 213 N. C. 9, 14, 195 S. E. 21, 25(1938).21,213 N. C. 160, 195 S. E. 368 (1938).
" See note 9, supra.
'E.g. UTAH CoNST. art. XIV, §3; WASH. CoNsr. art. VIII, §6.
" E.g. Aaiz. CONsT. art. IX, §8; PA. Coxsr. art. IX, §8.
"' For a collection of cases see 44 C. J. 1124, n. 66-68. See also JoNES, op. cit.
supra note 53, §103; I DR.LOI, op. cit. supra note 15, §214.
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tered authority to contract debt before it could be wiped out as in the
Charlotte situation.
4
THE EFFECT OF CONTRACTS EXCEEDING THE LIMIT
Situations will undoubtedly arise where a unit has attempted to con-
tract debt in excess of two-thirds of the preceding year's reduction in
violation of the amendment. It must be assumed that such a contract
would be void. 1 9 A difficult question would be presented where a par-
ticular debt straddled the limit, so to speak, in that the margin of non-
electoral borrowing power when it was incurred was less than the
amount of the debt. The question is whether the debt would be void
in toto or only to the amount that the limit had been exceeded. There
are decisions of courts of states having the conventional type of limita-
tion to support both of these alternatives. 20 A typical case is that of
a bond issue which overruns the limit. If the bonds were issued in
blocks, the answer would be easy because those blocks issued within the
limit would be fully separable for present purposes and thus valid. On
the other hand, if the bonds were all issued as a unit, or a particular
block straddled the limit, there is no fully satisfactory way of separating
the sheep from the goats; even though each bond is a separate debt
(if valid) all of them, being issued at the same time and, under current
practice, to the same purchaser or purchasers, are on an equal footing.
Thus there is no choosing between bonds in such a case, and the decisions
favoring the bondholder have usually simply apportioned the actual mar-
gin of borrowing power among them pro rata so that were the margin
$100,000 and the bond issue $200,000, each bond would be enforceable
to the extent of fifty cents on the dollar. Formal logic seems to be on
the side of total invalidity because the entire obligation is tainted by
the defect unless the parties themselves have made it separable, but a
cold syllogism would hardly do equity to the bondholder who had put
up his money in good faith for a useful public improvement. It can,
moreover, be urged with force in his behalf that pro rata enforcement
would be, not remaking contracts for the parties, but forcing the bor-
rower to go as far toward meeting its word as the constitution permits.121
Would the fact that a municipal bond ordinance passed in the fiscal
year 1937-38 authorized bonds exceeding in amount two-thirds of the
Whether by reason of recitals in bonds that all, statutory and constitutional
requirements, including a vote of the people, have been met, a unit would be
estopped to show invalidity is beyond the scope of this paper. On this important
question see generally I DILLON, op. cit. supra note 15, §204; 6 McQUILLIN, op.
cit. supra note 15, §2498 et seq.; I JoNEs, op. cit. supra note 53, §272.
'For a collection of cases see 6 McQuILLIN, op. cit. supra note 15, §2398.
' I DILLoiy, op. cit. supra note 15, §203. The remedy would be equitable, as
Dillon points out, and not legal.
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1936-37 reduction render it invalid per se or would it be valid as to any
bonds issued under it within the limit? The latter view seems the
sounder one because, so far as action by the local unit is concerned, it
is not the authorization but the contracting of new debt that the amend-
ment restricts. But, as applied to the general assembly the amendment
expressly forbids it to authorize a county or municipality to contract
debt in a given year in excess of the limit without a vote of the people.
This does not mean that a statute, unqualified in this respect, which
authorized a county or municipality to issue bonds, would be invalid.
Such a statute would doubtless be read in the light of the amendment
and conflict avoided. If this were not so the County and Municipal
Finance Acts would be incompatible with the amendment as they now
stand. The point is that a positive statutory authorization which could
not be so harmonized with the amendment, as where a statute in terms
required a county to issue a certain amount of bonds in a given year
without regard to any other debt incurred that year, comes under the
ban of the amendment and could not safely be relied upon as authority
for issuance of the bonds.1 22
TEE RELATION OF THE AMENDMENT TO OTHER PROVISIONS
OF THE CONSTITUTION'
This phase of our subject could be dismissed rather cursorily were
it not for the fact that the first part of the amendment, relating to the
four enumerated purposes that are not subject to the election require-
ment, is cast in the form of a positive grant of power to the general
assembly to contract debt, or to authorize local units to contract debt,
rather than in. the form of exceptions to a general restriction or limita-
tion. This section of the constitution formerly was set in the latter
mold, as is Section 7 of article VII. Whether there was actually any
intention to make the amendment a grant of power, and not merely a
set of "limitations upon the increase of public debts," as described in
its caption, is one thing, and what the words used mean is another.
Can it be said that the language used is so ambiguous in this respect
as to require or even warrant "construction"? We do not venture to
predict the answer of the supreme court. If the court construes the
amendment to be simply a limitation, existing limitations will be un-
affected. But if the court construes it to be a grant of power, it will
prevail, as the latest expression of the sovereign will, over any pre-
existing constitutional provision at any point of irreconcilable conflict.
'It is well to observe here that the court still recognizes the old "inherent
right" theory that a municipal corporation or county may issue bonds without
statutory authority for necessary expenses. Williamson v. High Point, 213 N. C.
96, 103, 195 S. E. 90, 94 (1938).
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The only old limitation with which it would appear ciearly to collide is
the limitation of Section 7 of article VII.123
1. Section 7 of Article VII
This section forbids a local unit to levy a tax, contract a debt or lend
its credit without the approval of a majority of its qualified voters,
except for necessary expenses. If the amendment is to be regarded as
a grant of power with respect to the enumerated purposes, would it not
permit the contracting of debt for those purposes without the approval
of the voters, even if those purposes were not "necessary expenses"?
That is the major question, and it is hardly Worth while to pursue the
subject further until the question whether the amendment grants power
has been authoritatively answered. It may be said in passing, however,
that quite probably each of the four enumerated purposes covers some
non-necessary expense territory.
There is no reference in the amendment to taxation, whereas the
limitation of Section 7 of article VII applies both to taxes and to debts.
The Federal and North Carolina Supreme Courts have embraced the
view that a grant of power to a local unit to incur bonded debt carries
with it by necessary implication the power to levy sufficient taxes to
pay the bonds, unless the contrary dearly appears.1 24  If the amend-
ment grants power to the general assembly to authorize the contracting
of non-necessary expense debt in certain cases, does the grant carry
with it by implication the power to authorize the levy of a tax to pay
such debt, without regard to the election requirement of Section 7 of
article VII? While the courts may be expected to try to harmonize
the two sections of the constitution so far as legtitimate interpretation
permits, there is a statement in the opinion in the Hallyburton case 25
which seems to imply that there might be points of conflict.
2. Section 6 of Article V
This section is strictly a tax limitation, applicable only to state and
county taxes. The maximum ad valorem tax for state and county pur-
poses is fifteen cents on the hundred dollars of taxable value, but a
"IN. C. CoNsT. art. II, §14, and art. VIII, §4, affect the subject of local debt
but it seems evident that there is no conflict with them.
I United States v. New Orleans, 98 U. S. 381, 29 L. ed. 225 (1878) ; Charlotte
v. Shepard, 122 N. C. 602, 29 S. E. 842 (1898).
=213 N. C. 9, 14, 195 S. E. 21, 25 (1938):
"It follows that the provisions of article 5, See. 4, now constitute the
dominant or controlling limitation upon the power of local units to contract
debts or to issue its bonds, and its provisions are superimposed upon the lim-
itations contained in article 7, Sec. 7, and in article 5, Sec. 6, of the Constitu-
tion. To the provisions of the section under consideration the former decisions
of this court must likewise yield and are no longer authoritative except within
the limitations of this section."
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county may exceed the limit for a "special purpose" with the special
approval of the legislature. If the amendment grants power to contract
debt, is the power accompanied by an implied power to levy a tax to
pay the debt, without regard to this section? It would seem that a new
constitutional debt provision which does not mention taxation and in
no wise refers to this section would -not have any effect upon it.12
Recent opinions of the supreme court, however, treat the two sections
together and contain several important dicta on the subject.
1. Some time ago the court referred to the tax limit of Section 6
of article V as applicable to cities and towns. 127 This misconception
has been repeated in three opinions handed down since November,
1936.128 This is unfortunate and the court will doubtless clarify the
matter at the first opportunity.
2. In the Hallyburton opinion129 it was said ' "This section (refer-
ring to the amendment) now further limits the right of governing
authorities of local governmental units in respect to the creation of
debts and the levy of taxes for the payment thereof." It is not per-
ceived how the amendment limits taxes except indirectly by limiting
debt.
3. In the Hallyburton opinion 180 the following appears:
"So that now, local units may create debts and issue their bonds for
necessary expenses without a vote of the people and without special
approval of the Legislature, provided that by so doing taxes in excess
of the limitations provided in article V, section 6, are not required, and
provided further that the total amount of such bonds and such other
bonds as may have been issued during that particular fiscal year do not
exceed two-thirds of the total amount by which the public debt of the
unit was decreased during the preceding fiscal year. Such local unit
may exceed the constitutional limitation on the taxing power by legis-
lative authority without the approval of the voters, provided the total
amount of bonds issued by such unit during any fiscal year does not
exceed two-thirds of the amount by which the debt of the unit was
decreased during the preceding fiscal year."
The first sentence implies that a tax limit operates as a debt limit but
it had been thought that the court had abandoned this view.1301 The
Charlotte v. Shepard, 122 N. C. 602, 29 S. E. 842 (1898), does not seem to
require a different conclusion; a maximum tax can be squared with the notion
of implied- power to levy a tax to pay an authorized debt-the implied power
theory would operate freely within the outside limit.
See Henderson v. Wilmington, 191 N. C. 269, 275, 132 S. E. 25, 28 (1926).
*s See Palmer v. Haywood County, 212 N. C. 284, 286, 193 S. E. 668, 670(1937) ; Hallyburton v. Bd. of Education, 213 N. C. 9, 14, 195 S. E. 21, 25 (1938);
Williamson v. High Point, 213 N. C. 96, 103, 195 S. E. 90, 94 (1938).
See note 9, supra. mIbid.
=a It was held in Proctor v. Board of Commissioners of Nash County, 182
N. C. 56, 109 S. E. 360 (1921), that school district bonds could not be issued
where the limited tax authorized by statute was not adequate to provide for their
payment. But this view seems to have been repudiated in Glenn v. Board of
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second sentence, since it contains no qualification in that respect, implies
that the fifteen cents tax limit may, since the amendment, be exceeded
for ordinary, as distinguished from special, purposes, whereas under
Section 6 of article V that can be done only for special purposes. The
more disturbing point is that, if this be true under the debt reduction
provision, it is even more true of the enumerated purposes as to which
the power to contract debts is expressly granted. In short, the subject
will bear elucidation. It is hard to believe that any one concerned had
any notion that the amendment had anything to do with tax limitations.
3. Section 3 of Article IX
This section provides:
"Each county of the State shall be divided into a convenient number
of districts, in which one or more public schools shall be maintained at
least six months in every year; and if the commissioners of any county
shall fail to comply with the aforesaid requirement of this section, they
shall be liable to indictment."
The supreme court has already squarely decided in the Hallyburton
case' 81 that new county debt for the constitutional six months' school
term is subject to the limitations of the amendment. This seems en-
tirely sound. The amendment is a comprehensive scheme of limitation
and, since the present purpose was not specified among those not sub-
ject to the election requirement, it comes within that restriction.18 2 In
its opinion the court went on to observe -that the duty to provide for the
six months school term rested primarily upon the state. It is hardly to
be inferred from this, however, that the state could contract debt to
maintain the minimum school program without regard to the amendment,
for, there again, one finds no exception made to cover the case. Doubt-
less, current expense debts contracted within current revenues for the
six months 9chool term would fall within the current expense theory
to which we have already adverted.' 33
Comm'rs of Durham County, 201 N. C. 233, 2391 159 S. E. 439, 442 (1931), where
it was said:
"The statute provides that funding and refunding bonds may be issued
where taxes for their payment are limited by the Constitution, as well as in
other cases. But this is only declaratory of the law as heretofore announced
in a number of cases. .. ."
There seems to be little authority on the subject in other states, doubtless because
ability to pay is not commonly regarded as any qualification upon the legal
authority or power to borrow, unless expressly made so. The view that a tax
limit operates as a debt limit was definitely rejected in Coles County v. Goehring,
209 Ill. 142, 70 N. E. 610 (1904).
= Ibid.
Thus county commissioners who fail to abide by N. C. CoNsT. art. IX, §3,
solely because the amendment precludes their doing so would doubtless not be
liable to indictment.
- See the topic, CURRENT ExpExNSEs, supra.
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Is county assumption of school district six-months-term debt con-
tracted before November 25, 1936, subject to the election requirement?
The answer would seem to be no, at least where the county had not
become legally bound to assume such debt prior to the taking effect of the
amendment. It has recently been held that if a county has not already
assumed such debt of one or more districts within its limits it has a
discretion under the school law as to whether it shall assume any
school district debt whatever.13 4 But under earlier decisions once such
debt of one district has been assumed there appears to be a duty to as-
sume like debt of all the others in the county.13 5 It was so held in one
decision rendered since the amendment, where the question whether
that duty of assumption survived the adoption of the amendment was
not raised.136
East Spencer v. Rowan County, 212 N. C. 425, 193 S. E. 837 (1937).
The earlier cases are cited in Mebane Graded School Dist. v. Alamance
County, 211 N. C. 213, 189 S. E. 873 (1937).
"Ibid.
